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BOOK REVIEWS
LAWYERS ON THiRx
OwN. By Jerome E. Carlin. New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 234, $6.00. A flamboyant subtitle for this book might
have been 'Texts to Accompany Daumier" or "Notes from the Fourth Circle."
Not that Mr. Carlin's modest, moderate, balanced, and observant sociological study
is itself flamboyant. It is a model of careful research in a limited area - a report
of interviews in depth with ninety-three individual practitioners of law selected
at random in 1957 in Chicago, buttressed by a variety of analytical charts and
many helpful references to literature in the field. But the picture that emerges of
these members of the bar is that of the ambitious, avaricious, envious, disgruntled,
and frustrated. They are the kind of men whose human features, as Dante has
depicted, are being effaced by a hectic concern for money.'
As Carlin shows in his first chapter, the motivation of most of these lawyers
to become lawyers was to achieve something called "status" - a modern version
of "fame," which these people believed somehow, magically, would attend their
admission to the bar. Discovering that there was no such magical transformation
of -themselves or even of their reputations, they have devoted themselves to making
money, so that at least half of Carlin's respondents have doubts about whether
they are in a profession or a business. Their work, as Chapter 2 spells out in detail, consists chiefly in bookkeeping, accounting, or semi-clerical work for small
corporations; real estate closings; tax foreclosures, and tax abatements; zoning
and licensing matters; personal injury suits; divorces; police court work; and
collections. As Chapter 3 makes clear, much of their effort is devoted not to serving clients, but to securing them - through ethnic, religious, or fraternal organizations (rather poor pickings), precinct political organizations (much more helpful), and runners or other lawyers (particularly helpful in building a personal
injury practice).
Chapter 4, tactfully entitled "The Ethical Dilemmas of Individual Practice,"
reveals a general disregard of the canons of professional ethics on the solicitation
of business; the general use of bribery to promote administrative action by clerks
of court and similar administrative officials; the probability of bribery and the
certainty of political influence in work involving tax foreclosure, tax abatements,
and zoning; and a pervasive lack of a sense of fiduciary obligation to the client.
The last "dilemma," is probably the most serious one, and it is manifested in two
ways. The dependence of "lower level" single lawyers on other lawyers for referrals, means that the referring lawyer is apt to be treated as more important than
the client. On the other hand, the "upper level" single lawyer is apt to have such
a close relationship with his business client that he enters into the deal with him.
Hence, Carlin's two subtitles "Clients are Expendable," and "Clients are Partners."
Not surprisingly, Chapter 5 demonstrates that men following this trade are
profoundly dissatisfied with it and with themselves. They feel themselves to be
the proletariat of the profession; they envy the big law firms; they envy professional men like doctors. Each boasts that he is his own boss; but the independence
of these lawyers is acknowledged to be illusory, as they are the slave of the most
pressing economic exigencies and at the beck of the meanest politicians. They
wonder why they ever took up the profession of law.
To anyone familiar with the practice of law in any large city in this country
the picture Carlin has drawn from their own lips of the individual practitioners in
a metropolitan area will not seem exaggerated. There are, of course, a few outstanding individual practitioners, exceptions to the average, although Carlin does
not appear to have encountered them. Moreover, as Carlin points out, there are
1 "They labored to be blind. And now their souls are dimmed past recognition." (Inferno, Canto 7, Ciardi trans.).
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nuanced distinctions between the practice and ethics of the "upper level" single
lawyer, using some technical skills and the "lower level" single lawyer, whose job
has become largely clerical. The picture also, it must be emphasized, is true of
the big cities where the practice of law is largely in the hands of the big firms, and
it is not to be taken as accurate for small towns or even medium size cities where
firms of over ten men are uncommon. Even restricted to the metropolitan one-man
law firm, Carlin's report is a disturbing one; half of the lawyers in these cities
are in the category he describes.
Carlin, as a good sociologist, is interested in changing the conditions that make
this kind of practice of law common. He says - quite rightly, I believe, - "Punishment of wrong under these circumstances makes very little sense except as a symbolic gesture, when the real problem is one of altering the underlying conditions.
S. .2 He further suggests that the responsibility for these conditions lies to some
extent with the leaders of the bar. He suggests, "In some strange way is appears
that the elite of the metropolitan bar has made its gentlemen's agreement with
the lower elements of the bar in the same way that it has made its peace with
the local politicians - namely, by agreeing not
to interfere with one another,
'

by a kind of ritual avoidance and separation.'

What shall the leaders do? Some of Carlin's data would seem to suggest
a primary fault in the law schools. Two-thirds of his respondents are graduates
of a handful of law schools. But it would be unfair to jump to conclusions here. Most
of the graduates interviewed went to law school in the thirties. Has there been
improvement in this kind of school since then? More information is needed, but
I should think the data presented by Carlin would call for inquiry both by the
American Bar Association and by the Association of American Law Schools. I
would also suppose that the teachers and lawyers involved in this work in the big
cities would want to ask themselves what they have accomplished. It would be ironic
indeed if men whose primary vocation is educational should be found in the past
to have made a positive and terrible contribution to a serious social evil - a turning loose upon the public of a substantial body of uneducated, irresponsible men
equipped for nothing else than to slip past the slack eye of bar examiners.
Apart from controlling entry to the profession more strictly, the bar could act,
as Carlin suggests, to reform legislation which is particularly conducive to "manipulation of officials" and so particularly the province of the one-man firm. In this
area Carlin cites the personal property tax laws, divorce laws, licensing, and zoning.
In most communities the first two types of law provide the kind of opportunity
he deplores, and they could be radically improved without serious harm to other
interests. I have more difficulty with his examples of zoning and licensing. Here,
it would seem there is an unavoidable element of discretion to be given the local
officials. I see no way of improving this kind of situation except by courts insisting on licensing and zoning boards observing all of the proprieties of a court.
What the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has done in regard to
the federal administrative licensing agencies such as the F.C.C. might, perhaps,
be done by a state court for municipal licensing and zoning agencies.4 '
Finally, Carlin recommends that a great deal of the work of the individual
practitioner be taken over by lay organizations. As he notes, this work requires a
low level of professional ability. It is in many instances, "a fairly routine, clericalbookkeeping job." 5 The lay organizations, such as banks, title companies, and accounting firms, are much better equipped to provide qualified service in these
areas than the individual lawyer. In fact, they have increasingly invaded the field.
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Text at 210.
Ibid.
E.g., Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. F.C.C., 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Sangamon
Television Corp. v. U.S., 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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However, they still seem to be admitted only grudgingly by the bar associations, and
there are occasional attempts by bar associations to prosecute them for the unauthorized practice of law. Carlin rightly feels that the efforts to keep the lay
organizations out are an anachronism, and his data makes clear that the individual
practitioners bring with them all the evils which it is claimed the lay associations
might bring. It would seem evident that a man is not practicing law merely because he is a lawyer, and that the courts ought to start drawing a line between
the routine clerical work and the areas of activity which still deserve to be protected as a profession.
A moralist might demur to Carlin's observation that the conditions "force
certain practitioners into unethical practices." These men are where they are because
they have chosen this kind of life: their practice reflects their values. Nonetheless, it is clear that a change in some conditions would at least eliminate some
of the ways in which these unhappy human beings choose to live. Carlin's book
is an important book for anyone interested in the improvement of the law. The
law schools could lead the way in all three areas of reform he proposes; their
efforts need to be given force by the prosperous leaders of the profession.
John T. Noonan, Jr.*

5 Text at 207.
* Editor, Natural Law Forum, Notre Dame Law School.
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